Background
The current Basel II "settings" for credit and operational risk are based on previous Quality Impact Studies (QISs) and some strategic negotiating by the regulators who drafted the document.
2 Several member countries decided to conduct a further national impact study or field test during 2004 or 2005, known as QIS4, which is expected to throw up worthwhile information at the national level about the impact of Basel II on individual countries. These exercises do not represent a joint effort of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and the details vary significantly across countries. Hence the Basel Committee will have a difficult time drawing global comparisons as countries are able to use their own formats, and these will not necessarily be comparable.
Nevertheless, the Committee's working group on "Overall Capital and Qua ntitative Impact
Studies" prepared templates to support these national exercises -first, a questionnaire in the form of an Excel workbook and second, corresponding instructions that specify how to complete the questionnaire. In contrast to earlier exercises conducted by the Committee, it is expected that national supervisory agencies intending to carry out an impact study or field test adjust the workbook accordingly to reflect the particularities of the implementation of the revised Framework in their respective jurisdiction. Similarly, the instructions provided only discuss technical issues related to the workbook and would have to be adjusted in order to reflect the changes to the workbook template national supervisors made. They are not intended to interpret the revised Framework. All guidance on issues related to implementation and interpretation of the revised Framework within a certain jurisdiction which might be necessary to complete the questionnaire will be provided by national supervisory agencies.
Although the exercise will be some improvement over the results of QIS3 (which held pretty limited data for operational risk), it is still unlikely to elicit a full blown response from banks in disclosing the type of data sought originally in QIS 2 (2002) . This second survey (QIS2, 2002) attempted to get loss data from banks over and above that from QIS1, through a loss data collection exercise. The type of data requested was the collection of granular (eventby-event) operational risk loss data to help the Committee determine the appropriate form and structure of the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA).. To facilitate the collection of comparable loss data at both the granular and aggregate levels across banks, the Committee again used its detailed framework for classifying losses. In the framework, losses were classified in terms of a matrix comprising eight standard business lines and seven loss event categories. These seven event categories were then further divided into 20 sub-categories, so that the Basel Committee could then attempt to retrieve from banks data on individual loss events classified at this second level of detail.
In QIS 2 the Committee also sought information on six "exposure indicators" such as number of employees or total assets. The exposure indicator data served two purposes. First, they were critical to the Committee's effort to aggregate loss data across banking institutions to arrive at an industry loss distribution. Second, the exposure indicators were necessary for banks and supervisors to relate historical loss experience to the current level of business activity. This information also enables banks and supervisors to determine separate frequency and severity distributions for the operational risk loss experience.
Although indicators other than gross income were included in this survey, the Committee did not at that stage envision revisiting the use of gross income as the base for the Basic Indicator and Standardised Approaches. However as will be seen in the next sections, the Committee changed its mind.
QIS2, although a repeat of QIS1, included a number of additional items but also simplified data requests. Specifically banks were no longer asked to provide operational risk loss data by `effect types', nor to provide quarterl y aggregated loss data, nor to provide data on the value of transactions/deals/trades, or the number of transactions/deals/trades. They were however asked to provide data on expected as well as received recoveries, to indicate the internal threshold used for collecting loss data, and to identify those losses arising from a `corporate centre' business.
Unfortunately the attempts in QIS2 and QIS3 to gather data on operational risk as an aid to policy formulation, proved difficult, according to several industry sources 3 , who said that banks were reluctant to give proprietary data to the regulator about some of the lawsuits they are currently involved with. Consequently, they declined to participate rather than give the regulator "edited" data.
In this paper we examine the fourth Quantitative Impact Study Survey (QIS-4) being circulated to participating US based institutions, so that the U. that it is not only one of the first of such studies issued, but it also asks some very specific questions about the measurement and management of operational risk. The results of the US survey will be used ultimately to produce a final revised risk-based capital rule for US qualifying institutions and is expected to be issued in 2006. The results are also expected to be used to ensure that minimum capital requirements are appropriately calibrated for both U.S. and international financial institutions.
To a large extent, the information and capital treatments requested in the QIS4 survey reflect provisions of the international capital framework proposed in June 2004 (the June framework) by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. It also reflects certain adjustments and clarifications needed to tailor the survey for U.S. implementation and to elicit specific policy information considered helpful for the U.S. rulemaking process.
The US regulators point out that the capital treatments set forth in QIS-4 are for the informational and analytical needs of the Federal Reserve Agencies only, and should not be construed to represent final decisions regarding implementation of new capital standards or reporting requirements. For example, this survey requests information for a banking organization on a consolidated basis, while future reporting requirements will include information on material subsidiaries and all insured entities using the new Framework. Table   1 summarises the questions specifically aimed at operational risk.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the requirements for operational risk that exist as at the date of the fourth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS4).
Section 3 discusses problems with OR specifications, while Section 4 explores the potential effects on efficiency and stability. Section 5 concludes by listing measurement and management difficulties, and putting forward an alternative to QIS4's questions on OR, which are more substantive than a state of the art review, which banks are unlikely to answer. 6. Were adjustments made to internal or external data to account for changes in the scale or scope of the business, or factors such as inflation?
7. Describe any correlation and diversification benefit assumptions used as part of the operational risk exposure calculation. Specifically, what model parameters were used as they relate to these assumptions (e.g., an x% correlation in operational losses across different business units)? Describe how you arrived at these assumptions. If there is a diversification benefit, is that amount held at the consolidated entity level or allocated back to the business line? If so, how?
8. Does the operational risk exposure number, reflected in cell G104 represent the sum of expected losses (EL) plus unexpected losses (UL), or UL only?
9. If the operational risk exposure number represents UL only, provide the following information: a. Provide the EL amounts, and describe how EL is derived (e.g. statistically measured, subjective estimation, etc.).
b. Describe how EL is accounted for. In particular, describe if operational risk EL is addressed through GAAP-compliant reserves/provisions, pricing or other internal business practices.
c. Cells G114 and G115 seek specific information on fraud-related losses. Describe the methodology used to categorize these losses as UL or EL? 10.
What loss data thresholds were used to collect the internal data underlying the calculations reported? Please be as specific as possible. If different thresholds were used for different business lines and/or event types, then each threshold should be listed together with a brief rationale for why that threshold value was chosen. Was there a mechanism through which losses under the threshold were reflected in either EL or in the estimate of the operational risk exposure (EL+UL)?
11. Describe the methodology used to take account of the effects of insurance.
The Final Basel II requirements for Operational Risk
The best source for current Basel II requirements is the document issued by the Basel capital ratio of 8%) and adding the resulting figures to the sum of risk-weighted assets compiled for credit risk. The ratio will be calculated in relation to the denominator, using regulatory capital as the numerator. The ratio must be no lower than 8% for total capital. Tier 2 capital will continue to be limited to 100% of Tier 1 capital. Minimum floors will be in place for BFIs using advanced models to determine risk levels to ensure that they do not underprovide for capital. Table 2 below.
It should be noted that in the Standardised Approach gross income is measured for each business line, not the whole institution, i.e. in corporate finance, the indicator is the gross income generated in the corporate finance business line. The total capital charge is calculated as the three-year average of the simple summation of the regulatory capital charges across each of the business lines in each year. In any given year, negative capital charges (resulting from negative gross income) in any business line may offset positive capital charges in other business lines without limit.
However, where the aggregate capital charge across all business lines within a given year is negative, then the input to the numerator for that year will be zero. The total capital charge may be expressed as:
KTSA={Óyears 1-3 max[Ó(GI1-8 x â1-8),0]}/3
Where 
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The values of the betas assigned to each business line are detailed in Table 3 below. The effect on the structure of BFIs with divisions that dominate the bank which also have higher assigned betas may lead to unintended effects on dynamic and allocative efficiency. These are discussed later in the paper. The above description appears simple. However, there are some obstacles that are perceived as insurmountable by many analysts. These are described in the ensuing sections.
Problems with Operational Risk Specifications
Operational Risk has been defined by Basel II as "the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events", with the overriding requirement that, internationally active banks and banks with significant operational risk exposures are expected to use an approach appropriate for the risk profile and sophistication of the institution.
Sources of operational risk are at times hard to segmentalise. types of consequences (Level 2) and require specific controls in order to reduce the inherent probability of loss, and hence produce a lower estimation of value at .risk. Level 3 details some activities that are the result of bad or non existent OR controls. At this point, it is helpful to consider the original management literature that first analysed operational risk in a manufacturing context, which suggested various measurement techniques.
9 This literature was based on refuting two assumptions -that factors which cannot be measured cannot be controlled and that quality cannot be measured so it cannot be controlled.
The second statement was soundly refuted by the total quality management movement that started in Japan in the middle of the twentieth century and then spread to the US manufacturing sector starting in the late 1970s. The problem is that there is no single measure of quality. Rather, it is reflected in consistent performance on a variety of eclectic measures, which were developed in a body of knowledge known as Statistical Process Control (SPC).
Unfortunately the SPC literature ignores that operational risk in banks is an amalgamation of many disparate risks. 10 While there have been many attempts to define it positively, its primary definition remains a negative one -losses that are not related to either credit or market events. Such events include fraud, settlement errors, accounting, and modelling mistakes, lawsuits, natural disasters, IT breakdowns, and many other types of loss. The heterogeneous nature of operational risk is a key difficulty underlying many of the issues we describe further in this article.
In credit and market risk, there is some commonality among the risks in question -they form a natural grouping. For example, credit risk is typically extended via a consistent process; the issues of default likelihood, exposure measurement, and loss-given default are similar; and the resulting exposures are subject to common risks, such as the risk of an economic downturn. Likewise, market risks deriving from price fluctuations of financial assets have common properties so that they can normally be managed in a consistent way, and modelled with a common process.
Operational risk appears to be different. It is useful to categorise operational risk into two groups -low-frequency large-loss events ('major'), for example, rogue trading, major lawsuits and natural disasters and high-frequency small-loss events ('minor'), for example, settlement errors and credit card fraud.
The primary challenge for a capital model is addressing the major events. These events can threaten the capital or even the solvency of the firm, as was seen in the Barings case. Minor events are a secondary challenge. Reducing these events may create efficiency savings but is unlikely to affect the risk of the bank materially.
The causes of major events can be complex. They often include human failure, organisational failure, and adverse external environmental factors, all acting in combination.
It is easy to see that a modeller who tries to capture the risk from major events has a very difficult, even questionable task.
Mathematical models are used in market and credit risk management for decision-making purposes because they provide the user with information on the potential losses that can be incurred for a given portfolio of positions. There is a clear link between the generators of risk -interest rate, equity price sensitivities and money lent -and the potential financial impact on the firm. The links can subsequently be tested and proved to work. The model should capture the essential features of the situation in a plausible manner; have predictive qualities that can be used for decision making; which can be validated.
At a minimum, a good risk model should enable an observor to judge whether bank A is riskier than bank B, and whether bank A's risk is increasing or decreasing over time. Market and credit risk models generally satisfy these requirements, even though there remains lively debate about the best approaches, implementation specifics and other features.
Operational risk models currently proposed do not appear to satisfy these requirements at present. Current models are typically descriptive and backward looking, with limited intuition about how key features could create a risk event. Holmes (2003) claims there is no model that has a convincing capability to rank interbank risk or bank risk over time, nor, most critically, is there any model that has been validated for the major events that are crucial for risk capital.
Typical operational risk models start with either a self-assessment 'scorecard' approach or a loss-data approach. The scorecard approach is inherently qualitative. It raises the question of whether scorecards are really models, or whether they are simply a formalisation of the discussions that already exist in banks about risk prioritisation. Holmes (2003) is sceptical that this approach would give reliable information about bank risk over time or rank the relative risk of two banks. There appears to be no conclusive evidence that these models work in practice and have predictive properties.
The loss-data approach (LDA) appears to be a more serious attempt at modelling this type of risk, and has many 'scientific' elements. These models typically collect losses down to a low dollar threshold then apply an 'off-the-shelf' distribution to fit the loss data. Patterns in the low-loss frequent observation area are -by virtue of the distribution -believed to affect the likelihood of a high-impact event.
In effect, the data and the distribution are the model. The model develops simply because of the addition of new loss events or a revision to the supposed distribution. There is no attempt to determine whether the risk or size of the portfolio has changed. This is analogous to trying to model credit risk using only past default losses, with no account taken of the size and riskiness of the current credit portfolio.
Fundamental challenges in measuring operational risk follow from flawed definitions.
Many groups in industry, academia and the regulatory community are trying to produce OR models for the finance industry, approaching operational risk measurement in a similar way to market risk and credit risk, using loss-data style models as their primary tool. The success of this approach will rest on whether operational risk has similar properties to market and credit risk.
One characteristic of operational risk that illustrates the weakness of the analogy is that while market and credit risk are independent of the bank taking the risk, operational risk is inherent in and an attribute of the bank itself. For example, consider two banks with identical trading positions and loan portfolios with exactly the same customers. Their market and credit risk will be the same but their operational risks could be significantly different. This poses deep issues for the use of industry-pooled data.
Both credit and market risk exposures are typically explicit, and normally accepted because of a discrete trading decision. Indeed, often the risk-taking decision depends on the ability to measure the risk of a transaction relative to its expected profitability. Market and credit exposures are also subject to well-understood concepts of quantifiable size. Credit risk exposures can be measured as money lent, mark-to-market exposure, or potential exposure on a derivative. The risk of the positions can be estimated using credit ratings, market-based models and other tools. Market risk positions can be treated as principal amounts or decomposed into risk sensitivities and exposures. The risk of these positions can be quantified with scenarios, value-at-risk models, and so on.
In both market and credit risk there is a direct link to the driver of risk, the size of the position and the level of risk exposure. These risk models allow the user to predict the potential impact on the firm for different risk positions in various market environments.
In contrast, operational risk is normally an implicit event. It is accepted as part of being in business, rather than as part of any particular transaction. There is also no inherent operational risk 'size' in any transaction, system, or process that is easy to measure .
A related issue is the issue of completeness of the portfolio of operational risk exposures.
For both market risk and credit risk, modelling starts with a known portfolio of risks. Indeed, it is a fundamental test of a bank's risk management systems and processes to ensure that there is complete risk capture. However, in operational risk modelling, the portfolio of risks is not available with any reasonable degree of certainty by any direct means. Even if a bank knows its processes and could ascertain the size of the risk in those processes, it is difficult to identify unknown risks or non-process type risks (for example, fraud risk or a new type of IT breakdown). As mentioned above, many major events are of this type -they are simply outside the bank's normal set of unde rstood risks (for example, the September 11 impact on trade processing capability in New York City).
The issue of completeness explains the weakness in proposed approaches to measuring operational risk that rely mainly on operational risk loss experience to infer a loss distribution.
In essence, these quantification approaches effectively try to imply the 'portfolio' of possible operational risk loss events from historic loss events. Imagine taking this approach to credit risk modelling, that is, 'deducing' the loan portfolio from historic defaults (experienced both at the bank in question and in the rest of the industry) instead of obtaining it from the firm's books and records -this would certainly not be regarded as an acceptable modelling approach for effective risk management.
It is important to realise that this lack of knowledge about the portfolio of possible operational risk loss events is not a technical modelling challenge; rather, it is an inherent characteristic of operational risk.
The third important issue that affects the ability to effectively measure operational risk is Context dependency is driven by how quickly the underlying system or process changes.
Many market risks appear to have a moderate level of context dependency, as stock market prices tend to exhibit statistical properties that appear to be somewhat stable across time (for example, New York Stock Exchange behaviour in 1925 would be recognisable to a modern trader). Likewise, credit ratings and loss statistics have been measured for many decades and show some reliable properties. The level of context dependency has a fundamental impact on the ability to model and validate a system; in general, the higher the context dependency, the less the past will be a good predictor for the future.
For those risk types that exhibit low context dependency and have high data frequency, it is usually possible to identify risk patterns and test whether these properties hold true over time.
That is, it is possible to use statistical methods to quantify the risk and to predict future outcomes. Conversely, for risk types that show high context dependency and low data frequency, it is inherently difficult to make predictions of their future size. Sufficient frequency of relevant data is critical for all risk modelling.
To summarise, operational risk has been divided into major and minor type events. It is arguable that adequate data exists to generate a distribution for minor events so that they can be treated with statistical methods, but these events are less important for risk. The primary challenge is addressing the major events that can adversely affect the capital of the firm, severely harm its reputation, or in extreme situations put it out of business. In this case, the high level of context dependency and the low level of relevant outcome data suggest that attempting to effectively quantify operational risk based on loss experience will be difficult because of the lack of data around major events.
Validation of operational risk models remains a major challenge. The causes of major events are often complex and due largely to human factors. The ability to predict future major events based on previous major events is difficult and questionable.
The ability to validate a model used to measure a given type of risk is also related to the frequency of outcome data from that risk. For market risk, model validation is relatively easy, by comparing daily VAR versus observed profit and loss (back testing). For credit risk, validation is possible but a longer time horizon -a number of years -is required, though other tools can also help close the gap. In contrast, information about major operational risk loss data is infrequent compared with market and credit risks. A fundamental challenge for any operational risk model is that the system changes in character (context dependency) before adequate data is accumulated to validate the model.
Application to financial services
SPC has been shaped largely in the context of product manufacturing. As such, its practices need to be adapted to the somewhat different circumstances of the financial services industry.
In some ways, however, its application may well be easier in finance. For example, the daily number of failed trades or unmatched confirms is already a sample of a significant number of individual transactions. As such, these are likely to be normally distributed.
Some experts in the field of SPC advise financial executives should look to their peers in manufacturing for important lessons in the analysis and control of operational risk 11 .
However, there are unique problems in the application of SPC to finance, which will be discussed in Section 5.
Before turning to the finer problems is it worth considering the relationship between operational risk minimisation and the regulatory goals that have been defined as the optimum for any government, central banker, or prudential supervisor. These goals are maintaining and improving systemic efficiency, stability, safety and confidence. This brief and simplistic overview of pricing principles above illustrates the potential effect of changes in capital adequacy requirements on the cost to the end user, and hence the efficiency of the banking system, and on a macro level the productivity frontier for the entire economy. Also to be considered is whether operational risk is a major cause of bank crises. However the worst bank failures in many OECD countries can be attributed to lack of private market mechanisms as well as the quandary of how governments can supervise entities they own. All the State Owned Banks failed in Australia during the late eighties due to failure to control risks of all types at every level 14. The implication of the above analysis of bank crises is that it does not directly support the view that OR capital adequacy requirements will achieve greater stability of the financial system. More efficient market mechanisms built on better governance and accountability practices may better achieve that goal.
Conclusion: The Appropriate Testing for Possible Strategic Effects of OR

Requirements
Difficulties with OR requirements can be divided into two -measurement and managements issues, the latter involving unintended side-effects. Holmes (2003) categorises the challenges of quantifying operational risk as follows:
• Lack of position equivalence. The lack of a quantifiable size (analogous to a risk sensitivity or exposure amount) in operational risk is a fundamental difference from credit or market risk. To this Lawrence (2003) • Completeness of the portfolio of operational risk exposures. Unlike market or credit risk, it is difficult to determine whether the portfolio of operational risks for a bank is complete. Lawrence (2003) would add to this an objection that the Basel II OR definition excludes the most important risks that result from an OR mistake -an increase in strategic and reputation risk levels, but includes legal risk, which should be in a separate category.
• Context dependency and relevance of loss data. Loss data is affected by continual change of organisations and the evolution of the environment in which they operate, degrading the relevance of this information over time. Lawrence (2003) also objects to the measurement of regulatory capital as the sum of the expected loss (EL) and the unexpected loss (UL) unless the bank can demonstrate that it is adequately capturing EL in its internal business practices.
• Validation difficulties. The difficulty in validating operational risk models reduces the reliability or usefulness of these models in predicting future outcomes. The granularity requirement is also perceived as a problem-that the bank's risk measurement system must capture all the major drivers of operational risk affecting the shape of the tail of the loss estimates. As pointed out by Lawrence (2003) Where a bank has various business lines assignment of OR losses will be difficult to justify as will collection of pre merger data after an acquisition.
The result of the alleged flaws in the Basel II guidelines in terms of measurement problems could be that if the bank is unable to use internally determined correlations, and in directly attempting to calculate the tail of an aggregate loss distribution will be subjected to extremely high errors due to insufficient statistics, overstatement of risk may result in providing capital far in excess of what is prudently required. In addition measuring expected loss is not an accurate process but at best an estimate based on past experience. Meanwhile accounting for expected losses is done in the budgetary process through reserves, pricing or expensing policies so that reserves will cover expected losses, and capital should only cover unexpected losses.
As far as management problems, Holmes (2003) has put forward the best summary of the pros and cons of attempting to quantify and provide for operational risk via capital adequacy.
He claims that against the argument of unattainability is the defence that attempting to model op risk, even if not scientific or reliable, may force firms to carry more capital and encourage better behaviour. Antagonists would reply that building a system on a weak foundation has serious implications; it is possible, perhaps even likely, that such an approach will engender its own problems. There are potentially unintended consequences that arise from the use of operational risk models for practical risk management purposes, including:
• False reliance. Attempting to summarise all operational risk into a single measure could be misleading and dangerous. Senior management may be given the impression of having a level of control akin to market or credit risk, when in reality the model is incomplete and unverified. Models will become the lens through which operational risk is viewed and managed.
• Management of the model rather than reality. The output from an operational risk model may cause senior management to take actions that reduce the model estimate of operational risk, but not address real core issues. Perhaps worse, the Basel II proposals require management to rely on these models in their daily management process.
• Misdirected focus. There is a risk of misdirected focus on the types of operational risk loss events -high-frequency small-loss minor events -that can be quantified, rather than on the major risks. Operational risk models based on historic losses means management become 'prisoners to data history' and will always be focused on fighting the last war.
• Misdirected resources. Operational risk quantification will also require resources, to establish this system to a standard sufficient for regulatory satisfaction. This will naturally divert resources from other risk work that may have more value. For example, there would no doubt be numerous requests to validate or further improve these models, regardless of whether this is meaningful or possible.
• Discouragement of 'whistle-blowers'. In the proposed quantified operational risk environment, bad news is disincentivised by an additional capital charge. Could identification of new risks or events be discouraged in a regime where such news could bring an additional capital charge? Will there be some additional incentive to 'handle' such a situation in private or downplay its significance if it will attract more capital to the financial institution?
• 'Blissful ignorance'. Models that are based on self-assessments or scorecards rely on the veracity of the source. Self-assessors that have higher self-awareness and greater understanding of controls are more likely to accurately identify and report weaknesses than those who are unaware of potential control issues -there is a risk that the 'boy scouts' get punished while the 'criminals' go free.
In conclusion, from the above analysis, we can see QIS4 is simply a state of the art survey.
It falls short in not attempting to gather meaningful input from banks as to difficulties, attitudes and experienced opinion. It assumes a totally quantitative approach to operational risk, ignoring the difference between minor and major or Black Swan events. 15 There remain vital unanswered questions that must urgently be addressed by regulators. These are described in Table 5 below . Unless a substantive test of strategic effects of operational risk requirements on bank behaviour and attitudes is undertaken, adverse side effects on systemic efficiency and stability could ensue. For instance, the effect on lending from over or under providing capital for financial institutions may lead to a credit crunch. However as usually happens with new regulatory frontiers, schools of education and research will spring up so that the regulatory process will eventually result in advances.
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